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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Voting-PROPERTY

QUALIFICATIONS
FOR VOTING
IN SPECIAL
PURPOSE DISTRICTS: BEYOND THE SCOPE OF "ONE MAN-ONE VOTE"

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
Property qualifications on the right to vote antedate the
Constitution.' Indeed, such restrictions were still being imposed by
ten of the original thirteen states when the Constitution was
adopted.2 "[T]he underlying idea was that a man's property entitled him to vote-not his character, his nationality, beliefs, or
residence, but his property. '3
By the 1960's, such a philosophy had become an anachronism.
Early in the decade, the Supreme Court, in Wesberry v. Sanders,4
and Reynolds v. Sims, 5 held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited the dilution of the effectiveness of a citizen's vote through the
I One writer, prominent at the turn of the century, stated: "During the seventeenth
century some property qualification upon voters was implied in the laws and customs of
many of the colonies, and in the eighteenth century such a requirement was universal." A.
McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 478
(1905); see M. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To VOTE IN AMERICA
1619-1850 (1969); C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY
1760-1860 (1960).
2 K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1918).
: Id. at 3; see A. DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN
AMERICA 56, 91-92, 117 (1951); C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 5.
A common justification made in support of this position is that the ownership of
property ensures that the voter has the requisite interest in community affairs which will
motivate him to vote responsibly. Dissenting in Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), Justice Harlan took a similar position:
It is .. .arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a
large percentage of Americans through most of our history, that people with some
property have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more
responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than
those without means, and that the community and Nation would be better managed
if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.
Id. at 685; see J. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 175
(1960).
However appealing these explanations may have been at one time, no state today
imposes property requirements for voting in general elections. XIX COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1972-1973, at 30 (1972). Nevertheless, as of 1969,
at least fourteen states imposed some property restrictions on voting rights in nongeneral
elections. See Note, Property Ownership Versus the Right To Vote: A Question of Equal Protection,
25 Sw. L.J. 633, 638 n.41 (1971).
4 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
5 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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malapportionment of congressional and state legislative districts.
Then, after some initial hesitation, 6 the Court extended its "one
man-one vote" rationale to elections for representatives in local
7
government bodies as well.
Underlying the Court's reapportionment decisions was a belief
that voting is a fundamental right.8 As Justice Black, speaking for
the Court in Wesberry said: "Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 9 Once acknowledged to
be fundamental, the right to vote was placed at the forefront of an
evolving "two-tier"' 0 equal protection doctrine which added sub6 Specifically, the Court had not required strict adherence to the one man-one vote
principle in local situations where appointive or administrative schemes were involved (see
Sailors v. Kent Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967)) and where leeway for experimentation
and innovation was essential in order to promote a political compromise in a city-county
consolidation. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). Compare notes 80-84 infra.
7 Hadley v.Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-66 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1964).
' 376 U.S. at 17. The Court in Reynolds similarly stated:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized. Almost a century ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
the Court referred to "the political franchise of voting" as "a fundamental political
right, because preservative of all rights."
377 U.S. at 561-62.
"' In applying the two-tier equal protection approach the first tier represents traditional
equal protection analysis while the second reflects the development of a more demanding
test. Under the traditional approach the Court's focus is directed towards determining
whether the challenged statute is rationally related to the stated legislative purpose. This
approach presumes that the statute is constitutional and it will not be struck down unless it is
shown to be without a rational basis-i.e., "wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulations' objectives." Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947); see
note 53 infra. The rationality test has recently been applied by the Supreme Court in several
noteworthy cases. See note 65 infra. For examples of its earlier application, see Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 'Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920);
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911).
Under the second tier the Court has determined that when the classification "operates to
the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution" a compelling interest test is to be'applied and the
statute is subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Strict judicial scrutiny essentially means that the statute is "not entitled
to the usual presumption of validity, and that the State rather than the complainants must
carry a 'heavy burden of justification.'" Id. at 16. Examples of suspect classifications and
fundamental rights which have motivated the Court to apply this higher standard of review
are cited in notes 13-14 infra.
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stantive gloss to the fourteenth amendment.'" Traditional equal
protection analysis (representing the first tier) would sustain a
statute simply if it were rationally related to a legitimate state
objective.'" However, under a strict scrutiny equal protection approach (representing the second tier) any provision infringing
upon a fundamental 13 right or establishing a suspect 4 classification
would be subjected to the rigors of close judicial scrutiny, and
would ultimately be upheld only if the state could establish that the
law was necessary in order to promote a compelling state interest.
11 The concept of strict scrutiny equal protection and the nature of its implications has
received notable recognition in recent years:
At the beginning of the 1960's, judicial intervention under the banner of equal
protection was virtually unknown outside racial discrimination cases. The
emergence of the "new" equal protection during the Warren Court's last decade
brought a dramatic change. Strict scrutiny of selected types of legislation proliferated. The familiar signals of "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest"

came to trigger the occasions for the new interventionist stance. The Warren Court
embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive "new"
equal protection, with scrutiny that was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other
contexts, the deferential "old" equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in

theory and virtually none in fact.
: * " The fundamental interests ingredient of the new equal protection was
particularly open-ended. It was the element which bore the closest resemblance to
freewheeling substantive due process, for it circumscribed legislative choices in the
name of newly articulated values that lacked clear support in constitutional text and
history.
Gunther, The Supreme "Court1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving DoctrineOn A Changing
Court, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see Cox, The Supreme Court 1965
Term, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotionof Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv.
91 (1966); Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protectingthe Poor Through
the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1133 (1969). See also Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal
Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972); Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
12 For a discussion of the rational relationship test, see notes 10-11 supra.
'3 The meaning of this term cannot be readily defined. The Court has suggested that a
fundamental right is one which is "explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). The Court has recognized the
right to procreate, the right to privacy, and the right to travel as fundamental. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
14 The Court in Rodriguez set forth the following characteristics as "traditional indicia of
suspectness": the class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 411 U.S. at 28;
see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (nationality); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968) (political allegiance); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race); cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(illegitimacy). See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (wealth); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(wealth).
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It was-inevitable that if the Court were willing to apply strict
scrutiny to state apportionment statutes which diluted a citizen's
vote, "[n]o less rigid an examination [was] applicable to statutes
denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by
residence and age."' 5 And in Kramer v. Union Free School DistrictNo.
15,16 the Supreme Court took such a step. The plaintiff in Kramer
was challenging, on equal protection grounds, a New York statute
which restricted voting in school board elections essentially to
property owners and parents living in the district, thereby denying
the franchise to otherwise qualified district residents. The Kramer
Court gave the statute a "close and exacting" examination, and
stipulated that any provision which "grants the right to vote to
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and
denies the franchise to others" must be necessary to promote a
7
compelling state interest if it is to pass constitutional muster.'
Reserving judgment on "whether the State in some circumstances
might limit the exercise of the franchise to those 'primarily interested' or 'primarily affected,'" the Court struck down the property restriction because a close scrutiny of the statute demonstrated
that it did not accomplish its stated goal of limiting the franchise to
community members who were, in fact, most interested in school
8
board affairs.'
The principles articulated in Kramer were subsequently reinforced in Cipriano v. City of Houma,1 9 and City of Phoenix v.
15 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (emphasis in
original).
16 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
17 Id. at 627. Kramer applied this approach after acknowledging the right to vote as
fundamental, essentially relying on the statement to this effect made in Reynolds. Id. at 626.
is Id. at 632. The Court explained that
whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens
"primarily interested" deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends,
inter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or
affected than those the statute includes.
Id. Given this analysis the majority concluded that the statutory classifications allowed
"inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest.., and, on the
other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest." Id. On this basis the law
was held to be unconstitutional.
19 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Cipriano involved a challenge of various provisions of Louisiana
law which limited the right to vote to property taxpayers in elections called to determine
whether or not revenue bonds would be raised by the municipality for the use of its utility
system. Relying on Kramer, the Court stated that "if a challenged state statute grants the right
to vote in a limited purpose election to some otherwise qualified voters and denies it to
others, 'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest r " Id. at 704. Here too, the Court refused to determine whether
property qualifications might be permissible under some circumstances. Instead, the Court
relied exclusively on a Kramer approach by focusing on whether the statute was precisely
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Kolodziejski,2 0 where the Court utilized an identical equal protection
analysis to strike down property ownership requirements which
had been established for revenue and general obligation bond
elections. Although the Court never explicitly declared property
qualifications unconstitutional per se, it had seemingly forced their
collapse through a rigid application of the strict scrutiny equal
protection approach. 2 '
Within this favorable constitutional context, a group of small
landowners, residents, and a lessee of the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District brought suit in federal court attacking the constituconstrued so that "all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than
those the statute includes." Id. at 704, quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621, 632 (1969). On this basis the Court found the law to be in violation of the equal
protection clause, noting that both property owners and nonproperty owners were affected
by the utility system and together shared the costs of supporting it. 395 U.S. at 705.
20 399 U.S. 204 (1970). The plaintiff here attacked the validity of an election scheme
which had been adopted to determine the approval of general obligation bonds. Although
other sources were available, the ensuing indebtedness was to be financed by property taxes;
accordingly, the statute restricted the vote to real property taxpayers. The Supreme Court,
through Justice White, held that the equal protection clause was violated by the exclusion of
nonproperty taxpayers from these elections. Id. at 205. Stating that any such exclusions must
be necessary to promote a compelling state interest in order to withstand constitutional
attack (id. at 205), Justice White stressed that the differences between property taxpayers
and nonproperty taxpayers were not substantial enough to justify the existing election
scheme. In support of this position Justice White pointed out that all residents have a
substantial interest in public facilities and "will be substantially affected by the ultimate
outcome of the bond election." Id. at 209. He concluded that "[p]resumptively, when all
citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum,
the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified
citizens from the franchise." Id.
21 Kramer itself had an immediate impact on existing state legislation which had
preserved certain property restrictions on the right to vote in specified elections.
Before Kramer was decided, only fourteen states still had provisions that restricted
the right to vote in elections to property owners. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1; ARIZ.
CONST. art. VII, § 13; CoLo. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6-8; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6;
IDAHO CO Sr. art. VIII, § 3; LA.CONST. art. XIV, § 14(a); MICH. CONST.art. II, § 6;
MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 12; N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 2012
(McKinney 1969); OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 27; R.I. CONST. amend. XXIX, § 2; TEx.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(a); UTAH CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Since Kramer the specified
provisions of the states of Arizona, Louisiana, and New York have been declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. See City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). Likewise, the
specified provisions of Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah have
been declared unconstitutional by the highest court of each of those states. See Pike v.
School Dist. No. 11,474 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1970); Muench v. Paine, 94 Idaho 12,480
P.2d 196 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Maloney, 82 N.M. 167, 477 P.2d 605 (1970);
City of Spencer v. Rayburn, 483 P.2d 735 (Okla. 1971); Cypert v. Washington
County School Dist., 24 Utah 2d 419, 473 P.2d 887 (1970).
Note, supra note 3, at 638 n.41; see Note, The Last Bastion Crumbles: All PropertyRestrictionson
the Franchiseare Unconstitutional, I N.M.L. REv. 403 (1971); Note, Voting Rights--Owership of
Property No Longer a Valid Qualification, 23 Sw. L.J. 964 (1969).

692

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:687

tioniality of two statutory provisions of the California Water Storage
District Act. 22 The statute reflected a conscious effort by the
California legislature to limit the franchise to those who were
ostensibly most affected by district affairs, and therefore who
would be most interested in district elections. Accordingly, the
right to vote in elections for the district board of directors was
limited to landowners. Moreover, votes were weighted according to
the assessed valuation of each voter's land.2 3 This latest challenge
to restrictions on the franchise imposed by states in local governmental affairs provided the Court with an opportunity once again
to expand upon the rationale of Kramer.
However, this particular equal protection challenge was distinguished from earlier voting cases because the object of the plaintiffs' attack was the voting structure of a special purpose district,24 a
unit of local government historically designed to provide an individualized response to the special problems of a particular
locality. 2 5 A three-judge district court denied the plailitiffs' request
22 The type of local governmental unit whose election procedure was challenged is a
water storage district organized in accordance with the California Water Storage Act. See
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 39000-48401 (West 1966).
23 Id. §§ 41000-01. Section 41000 provides as follows: "Only the holders of title to land
are entitled to vote at a general election." Section 41001 imposes the following weighted
voting scheme: "Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him
is situated and may cast 6ne vote for each one hundred dollars ($100), or fraction thereof,
worth of his land."
24 Special purpose districts "are organized governmental units operating outside the
realm of general'county government established to perform a single function or multifunctions as authorized by the enabling body creating them." U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROFILE OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT 37 (1972). Encompassing
such broad areas as health, transportation, sanitation, utilities, education, parks, and agricultural assistance, special purpose districts typically "transcend city, county, and even State
boundaries.., and... have been utilized to solve increasingly large and complex problems
of our urban, [suburban], and rural populations." B. NOVAK, A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNOTATED 1 (1968); see J.
BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 21-23 (1957); U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS

(1964); Hankerson, Special Governmental Districts, 35 TEx. L. REv.
1004 (1957); Jones, The Organizationof a Metropolitan Region, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 538 (1957);
Tobin, The Legal and Governmental Status of the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 129 (1958).
25 This particular district consisted of 193,000 acres of farmland located in the Tulare
Lake Basin. The district's population at the time this action was initiated was 77 with most of
the adults in this group working for one of the four corporations that owned 85% of the
district farmland. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
723 (1973). Responsibility for governing the district is given by statute to a board of
directors, each of whom is elected from one of the divisions within the district. CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 40658, 39929 (West 1966). Elections for these positions are required to be held in
odd-numbered years. Id. § 41300. The actual duties of the board are set out in § 42200:
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

to enjoin the district from giving effect to the statutory voting
provisions.2 6 With one judge partially dissenting, the district court
held that "limiting the vote to landowners in this particular water
district does not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights," and that
"the 'one man, one vote' cases cited by the plaintiffs are not
controlling in this special purpose district. '27 Moreover, the court
refused to strike down the water district's proportionate voting
system. 2 8 In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District,2 9 the Supreme Court affirmed this ruling.
I
AN EXCEPTION TO "ONE MAN-ONE VOTE"

The appellants' argument challenging the property qualification in district elections was broadly based on the principles
which the Supreme Court had set down in the Kramer, Cipriano,
and Phoenix trilogy. Arguably, these decisions, taken together,
signaled the Supreme Court's willingness to declare property restrictions on the franchise to be unconstitutional." At the very
least, these cases strongly supported the proposition that statutes
which selectively distributed the franchise in an attempt to limit
voting rights to those ostensibly "primarily interested" or "primarUpon the organization of a district, the board shall make or cause to be made all
examinations, surveys, detailed plans and specifications, and estimates of costs for
the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of
water, any drainage or reclamation works connected therewith, and the generation
of hydroelectric energy incident thereto, and the sale and distribution thereof, as
may be necessary or requisite to enable the board to ascertain and estimate the
requirements and works necessary for the purpose of the district, and the probable
cost and to make a report.
Additional responsibilities include the levying of tolls and charges and acquiring, improving,
and operating "the necessary works for the storage and distribution of water, and any
drainage or reclamation works connected therewith." Id. § 43000. Project costs are apportioned "in accordance with the benefits that will accrue to each tract of land held in separate
ownership." Id. § 46176. Tolls and charges are also levied on a similarly apportioned basis.
Id. § 43006.
26 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.
Cal. 1972).
27

Id. at 146.

Id. The'court stated that
§ 41001 providing one vote for each $100 of assessed valuation is not unconstitutional as the benefits and burdens to each landowner in the District are in
proportion to the assessed value of the land, so permitting voting in the same
proportion fairly distributes the voting influence.
28

Id.

29 410 U.S. 719 (1973); see Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (companion case to Salyer).
"0 See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
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ily affected" would be subjected to an "exacting standard of precision," and would ultimately be struck down if they did not effectively meet their stated goal.3 1 Moreover, each decision stressed
that such statutes must be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest if they were to avoid constitutional infirmity. Relying on
the Court's earlier precedents, the appellants in Salyer maintained
that limiting the vote to landoWners violated the equal protection
clause because the possibility of flood damage and the ensuing loss
of jobs gave nonlandowning residents "as much interest in the
operations of a [water] district as landowners who may or may not
be residents. 32
However persuasive Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix may once
have been, the Court was unwilling to acknowledge their applicability to Salyer. Speaking through Justice Rehnquist, the majority was
quick to point out that in the cases relied on by the appellants, the
Court had not absolutely forbidden the states from limiting the
franchise to citizens primarily affected by a local governmental unit
(at the expense of those only remotely concerned).3 3 Rather, in
Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix, the particular schemes under attack
had simply gone too far-excluding from the franchise those who
should have been included, and including those who might have
been excluded.3 4 In contrast, the California scheme under consideration in Salyer was drawn artfully enough to avoid such
infirmities.
Of even greater significance was the character of the governmental unit under attack in Salyer. Cipriano, Phoenix, and even
Kramer involved units of local government with authority over
general governmental affairs, such as education and bonding. On
the other hand, Salyer involved a Water Storage District-a peculiar
creation of Western states designed for the limited function of
guaranteeing a sufficient and even flow of water to the land within
its jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not difficult to recognize that
landowners within the district had overwhelming interests in the
successful operation of the district while the interests of other
31 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); see Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 393 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); notes 17-20 supra.
32 410 U.S. at 726. It should be noted that landowners were given the right to vote
regardless of whether they were also district residents. A corporation, for example, could
own land and still not be considered a district resident. Furthermore, as the opinion points
out, mere residency without landownership does not entitle the resident to vote. Id. at 730.
33 Id. at 726-27.
34 Id.
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residents were correspondingly remote.
Such a classification could
35
not be easily made in prior cases.
Strangely absent from the Salyer discussion of Kramer was any
mention of the character of voting as a fundamental right and of
the Kramer Court's emphasis on applying strict judicial scrutiny to
any state scheme which sought to limit the franchise.3 6 Kramer had
emphasized that the basis of the Court's earlier one man-one vote
decisions was the recognition that voting was a right of citizenship
and was not given to citizens because of their membership in any
particular interest groups. Any state scheme which denied to citizens, otherwise qualified by age and residence, the right to vote
because of an economic or other interest group analysis was au3 7
tomatically suspect.
Instead, the Salyer Court turned to two pre-Kramer decisions to
support its reasoning. In Avery v. Midland County,38 the Court
extended the principle of one man-one vote to an election for
county commissioners. This was the first application of the doctrine
to a local governmental body. However, the Avery Court in dictum suggested that there may be special purpose units of local
government to which the principle of one man-one vote need
not be applied. 3 9 Two years later, in Hadley v. Junior College Dis's Significantly, the Salyer Court did not attempt to directly explain why the school
district in Kramer could not have been considered a special purpose district, and accordingly
why these issues were not initially raised in that context. This is particularly puzzling in light
of the fact that the school districts' functions are 'judged by many people ...to be the most
important of all governmental undertakings." Bollens, supra note 24, at 181. A simple
explanation might be that the school district in Kramer did not have sufficient autonomy to
be considered a special purpose district for the Court's purposes. The Kramer Court
acknowledged that "the school district maintains significant control over the administration of
local school district affairs" but also pointed out that generally "the board of education has
the basic responsibility for local school operation." 395 U.S. at 623-24; see J. BOLLENS, supra

note 24, at 179-227. The Court's failure to distinguish Kramer more precisely on a factual
basis is consistent with its reluctance to set down definitive standards with respect to which
special purpose units fall within the scope of its ruling. For a better explanation of the
reasoning underlying this aspect of the Court's decision, see notes 85-93 and accompanying
text infra.

36 395 U.S. at 626.
17 In Reynolds, the Court specifically noted that "[lI]egislators represent people, not trees
or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." 377 U.S.
at 562. This point is later reinforced in the opinion when the Court states that "neither
history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in
attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history
or economic interests, cast votes." Id. at 579-80.
38 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
39The Avery Court raised the following set of circumstances as a possible exception to
the Reynolds rule:
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trict,4 ° the Court extended its application of the Reynolds principle
to the election of junior college district trustees who, although
having powers of a lesser scope than those of the Midland County
Commissioners, were nevertheless considered to be exercising "important governmental functions" which had "sufficient impact
throughout the district."'" However, here too, the Court used dicta
to repeat its warning that, in the case of local governmental bodies,
there might be an exception to the principle of one man-one vote:
It is of course possible that there might be some case in which a
State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed
from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately
affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with
Reynolds . . .might not be required .

*...42

Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Salyer, characterized the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, "by reason of
its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its
activities on landowners as a group," as precisely the sort of
governmental unit contemplated in Avery and Hadley as an exception to the one man-one vote rule.4 3 Since the special purpose
district exercised relatively limited authority, provided no other
general public services, and imposed disproportionate economic
burdens on landowners, "it is quite understandable that the statutory framework for election of directors . . .focuses on the land

benefited rather than on people as such. 4 4 Accordingly, the one
man-one vote Reynolds principle was held to be inapplicable to the
45
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.
In a strong dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, took issue with the majority opinion on this ground.
Hadley, as analyzed by Justice Douglas, represented a significant
Were the [county governing body] a special-purpose unit of government assigned the
performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than
other constituents, we would have to confront the question whethersuch a body may be
apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the
organization'sfunctions.
Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added). The Court went on to hold, however, that the Constitution
would permit "no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of
local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body." Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
40 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
41 Id. at 54.
42 Id. at 56.
43 410 U.S. at 728.
44 Id. at'728-30.
45 Id.
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departure from the Avery test.4 6 Contrasting the effect of these two
decisions, Justice Douglas noted that under Avery, the Reynolds
principle would be applied to local units exercising "general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body" whereas the Hadley decision required only that the particular
unit be performing "important governmental functions" having
"sufficient impact throughout the district." 47 Justice Douglas's position is well founded. A close analysis of Hadley indicates that the
Court emphatically rejected the drawing of constitutional distinctions based upon the purpose of an election. 48 Writing for the
Hadley majority, Justice Black stated that he could not "readily
perceive judicially manageable standards to aid in such a task" and
that the state's decision to hold an election is a "strong enough
indication" that the subject matter involved is important.4 9 Therefore, while Hadley did recognize the possible existence of an excep46 Id. at 739 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 739-40. For the one man-one vote rule to apply under Hadley, the unit need not
be exercising general governmental powers; rather, whatever powers it does exercise must
be important and have sufficient impact throughout the district. Justice Douglas cited the
following excerpt from Hadley to support this conclusion:
"[S]ince the trustees can levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions,
hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the operations of the junior college, their powers are
equivalent, for apportionment purposes, to those exercised by the county commissioners in Avery. . . . [T]hese powers, while not fully as broad as those of the
Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important
governmentalfunctions ...and have sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the
conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied
here."
Id. at 739-40, quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); see Note, The Impact
of Voter Equality on RepresentationalStructures of Local Government, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 639, 646
(1972); Note, Local Reapportionment-"OneMan, One Vote" Held Applicable to Special-Function
Units of Local Government, 16 VIL.. L. REv. 158, 163 (1970).
48 397 U.S. at 54. The Court stated:
If one person's vote is given less weight through unequal apportionment, his right
to equal voting participation is impaired just as much when he votes for a school
board member as when he votes for a state legislator. While there are differences in
the powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the right of each
qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process. It should
be remembered that in cases like this one we are asked by voters to insure that they
are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm from unequal
treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials selected.
Id. at 55. Similarly, the Court in Kramer noted:
Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected because the district
meetings and the school board do not have "general" legislative powers. Our
exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is
required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are
not.
395 U.S. at 629.
49 397 U.S. at 55.
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tion to Reynolds, the decision's overall language strongly suggests
that the Avery exception had been severely limited. Significantly,
Justice Harlan's dissent in Hadley specifically recognized that the
majority's decision took "specialized local entities" from "irrigation
districts to air pollution control agencies to school districts" outside
the limitation which Avery had set down. 50 Accordingly, Justice
Rehnquist's conclusion that the water storage district in Salyer is
"the sort of exception" to the Reynolds rule which Avery and Hadley
contemplated, represents an interpretation of the latter decision
which gives more of an expansionist scope to the Avery exception
than a literal reading of -jadley would otherwise suggest. 51
II
THE STANDARD

OF REVIEW:

Salyer

AND

STRICT

SCRUTINY EQUAL PROTECTION

Once it found that the one man-one vote doctrine was not
controlling in the case-of this special purpose district, 'the Court
proceeded to evaluate the equal protection questions raised by the
appellants without subjecting the challenged provisions to close
judicial scrutiny or a compelling interest test. 52 Justice Rehnquist,
relying on a mere test of rationality, asserted that the statutory
provision would not violate the equal protection clause so long as it
was not " 'wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the regulation's
objectives.' -5 In applying this rational basis standard Justice
Rehnquist emphasized the distribution of benefits and burdens
which resulted from the district's operations, and concluded that
the state could logically have decided that landowners were the
50 Id. at 60-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51 Certainly neither Hadley nor Avey contemplated application of the exception in a
situation where the right to vote has been denied and not simply diluted. Yet this is precisely
what has happened to the residents and lessees of the Tulare Water District.
52 Significantly, the federal district court which initially reviewed the case was willing to
apply a compelling interest test. Salyer v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F.
Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Cal. 1972). The court there found that the state had a compelling
interest in the election scheme which it had established for the water district. Id.
53 410 U.S. 730 (1973). This formula was first stated in Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). Later, Justice Rehnquist recited a similar test in
reviewing the equal protection claims of appellant-lessees. 410 U.S. at 732. The standard
there was whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the state's
decision. Id; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
54 410 U.S. at 730-31. Justice Rehnquist was unimpressed by arguments which suggested that "assessments imposed by the district become a cost of doing business for those
who farm within it." Id. at 730. Apparently, such an interest was too tenuous. Pointing out
that since it was the landowners' property which was subject to any liens potentially imposed
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only parties entitled to the franchise.5 4 A similar analysis prevailed
with respect to the remaining constitutional claims made by the
appellants. The appellant lessee had argued that "even if residents
may be excluded from the vote, lessees who farm the land have
from those of the
interests that are indistinguishable
landowners." 55 The appellant landowners (all with small land holdings) claimed that the Court's decisions in Gray v. Sanders,5 6 and
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,5 7 mandated a finding that the
proportional voting system based on assessed land valuation violated the equal protection clause.5 8 Neither claim was successful; in
each instance the constitutional attacks were rejected because the
Court was able to find a rational basis to support the state policy.5 9
The equal protection analysis undertaken by the Salyer Court
by the district, the election scheme instituted may have been necessary as a practical matter
to win their support when the district was initially proposed. Id. at 731. Compare this
analysis with the Court's handling of a somewhat similar lien-oriented argument made by the
state in a losing cause in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209-11 (1970). Note
also that the Phoenix Court was willing to acknowledge indirect effects such as the increased
costs of goods and services as an indication that others, besides property owners, had an
interest in the election. Id. at 211. This is in sharp contrast to the interests Justice Rehnquist
was willing to recognize in Salyer.
55 410 U.S. at 731. Essentially the lessees argued that they had an interest in how much
water was available for farming and that they were effectively paying for some of the
district's costs through increased rental payments.
56 372 U.S. 368 (1963). In Gray, Georgia's "county unit" system for weighting votes in
primary elections for statewide offices was struck down by the Court because of large
disparities between county populations and the number of unit votes each county was
alloted. The Court stated that "once the class of voters is chosen... we see no constitutional
way by which equality of voting power may be evaded." Id. at 381. It stressed that votes must
be equal regardless of race, sex, occupation, or income. Id. at 379-80.
57 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper, the Supreme Court held that Virginia's poll tax in
state elections was unconstitutional. The Court announced that voter qualifications have no
relation to wealth and that therefore the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated whenever the state makes affluence an electoral standard. Id. at 668; see
Note, State Poll Tax Prerequisiteto Voting-Denial of Equal Protection-Harperv. Virginia State
Board of Elections, 16 AM. U.L. REv. 128, 136 (1966). See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
s 410 U.S. at 733-34.
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the lessee's interest in district activities but nevertheless maintained that the statute must be upheld if it was not irrational. The Justice reasoned
that the statute was rational because giving lessees the vote could create administrative
problems as well as subject the system to possible manipulation by large landowners. Id. at
732. It was also pointed out that lessees were not without a remedy because they could
acquire the vote through contractual negotiation. Id. at 733.
Justice Rehnquist could not logically refute the landowners' arguments against the
weighted voting system. He simply stated that the appellants' position based on Harper and
Gray "ignores the realities of water storage district operation." Id. at 734. Justice Rehnquist
was referring to the high costs involved in district activities. After reviewing the nature of
these costs and how assessments were made, the proportional voting system was sustained.
Id. at 734.
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represents a sharp break with precedent. Under the established
equal protection framework, the right to vote, because of its fundamental nature, has consistently been afforded protection under
the more demanding -standard of review providing for strict
scrutiny and a compelling interest test. 60 The Salyer majority,
however, was clearly averse to extending similar protection to the
appellants' asserted voting rights. Under the framework of. strict
scrutiny equal protection, the threshold question to be resolved in
each case has been whether or not a fundamental right or suspect
classification is involved; if so, the higher standard is to be invoked.
In all other cases the statute may gain constitutional approval
simply if a rational basis can be found to support it.61 This initial
determination has been of considerable consequence because it
usually determines the outcome of a case. 2 Yet, ostensibly the Salyer
Court never dealt with this issue; instead, the rationality standard
was applied, seemingly without any discussion concerning the nature of 'the rights which were at stake.6 3 The absence of discussion
concerning a matter which, in the past, had been a threshold
question of equal protection analysis suggests the possibility of two
important developments in the Supreme Court's current approach
60 See notes 9-11, 13 & 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
61 See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
62 It is generally not difficult to discern some rational bases for upholding a statute. But
see notes 65-67 infra. However, a rational basis alone will not support a statute under the
higher standard of review where a compelling state interest must also be found. As
previously pointed out, the state thus assumes a heavy burden of justification. See note 10
supra. Furthermore, even when a compelling state interest is established, the statute must
also be "precisely tailored" so that it will pass the test of close judicial scrutiny.
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements
further a very substantial state interest. In pursuing that important interest the
State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally
protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
"precision" . . . and must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives ....

If

the [State) acts at all it must choose "less drastic means."
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (footnote omitted); see notes 18-20 and
accompanying text supra. The Chief Justice has stated: "So far as I am aware, no state law
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it
demands nothing less than perfection." 405 U.S. at 363. But see note 52 supra. It has been
suggested that no state could ever establish a compelling interest concerning property
qualifications on the franchise in light of the fact that most, states persevere without any such
restrictions. See Note, Restriction of Franchiseto Property Owners in Texas School Bond Elections
Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 49 TEx. L. REv. 1113,
1119 (1971).
63 Although the majority did not discuss this matter, Justice Douglas's dissent placed
considerable emphasis on the right to vote as fundamental and on the constitutional
protection it therefore deserves. His arguments were derived from the strict scrutiny equal
protection framework as it stood before this case. See generally notes 10-11, 18-20 & 36-37
and accompanying text supra.
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to these issues: (1) the strict dichotomy automatically providing
fundamental and nonfundamental rights with different degrees of
protection may be dissipating; and (2) application of the lower
standard of review was effectively predetermined by the Court's
recognition of a newly created exception to the principle of one
man-one vote.
On one level of analysis, the majority's failure to acknowledge
the applicability of heretofore established equal protection principles reflects a "mounting discontent" with a strict two-tier
formula. 4 Certainly this is not the first case in recent years where
the Court has relied upon the rational basis standard when the
higher fundamental interest-strict scrutiny test might readily have
been invoked.6 5 The Salyer decision is the most significant of these,
however, because it strikes at a right which has been at the forefront of the "new" equal protection movement. 6 6 To this extent the
decision is indicative of a judicial philosophy which favors the
application of the traditional rationality test even when fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved.6 7
This analysis, albeit plausible and consistent with recent case
law, 68 does not adequately explain Justice Rehnquist's initial em64.See Gunther, supra note 11, at 10-20. However, it should be noted that the Court later
confirmed the appropriateness of the basic two-tier approach in San Antonio Ind. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See generally notes 10-11 supra.
65 See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
66 Indeed, Harper and the reapportionment decisions were once heralded as having
presaged "a preferred position for voting rights as key or fundamental rights, somewhat
analogous to the special position ...afforded to first amendment rights." Note, Elections and
Equal Protection-Propertyand Other Voting Restrictions on Local Elections, 4 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 431,442 (1969). It is evident that the Court's position on voting as
a fundamental right is unsettled.
67 Gunther, supra note 11, at 12. Note, however, that all the cases cited in note 65, with
the exception of Weber, effectively protected the rights involved even after applying the
"traditionally toothless minimal scrutiny standard." Id. at 13-14. Professor Gunther states
that "[t~hese are truly startling and intriguing developments. After the years in which the
strict scrutiny invalidation and minimal scrutiny nonintervention correlations were virtually
perfect, the pattern has suddenly become unsettled." Id. at 19.
Ironically; the Salyer Court's seeming disregard for the compelling interest test has
occurred at a time when California, the state where the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District is located, has decided that the strict scrutiny standard is appropriate in reviewing all
election provisions containing property qualifications. The Supreme Court of California has
even expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of earlier schemes which had been approved
under the less rigid standard. See Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 2d 942, 501 P.2d
537, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972); Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist., 5 Cal.
3d 671, 682 n.8, 488 P.2d 395, 403 n.8, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203, 211 n.8 (1971).
6 See note 65 supra.
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69
phasis on the development of an exception to the Reynolds rule.
More specifically, it does not identify the reasoning underlying his
reliance or reapportionment decisions and principles to reject the
arguments of appellants who had based their claims on a theory of
absolute deprivation of the franchise, and not on the dilution of
voting power. 70 A close examination of the Court's approach,
however, indicates that the development of an exception to the one
man-one vote principle was designed not only for its inevitable
impact in the area of reapportionment, but also for its conclusive
effect on the Court's choice of the appropriate equal protection
standard to use in testing the California statute.
It has been observed that underlying the early reapportionment decisions was a basic recognition of the right to vote as
fundamental, and that this recognition was a generating factor in
the development of the one man-one vote principle.7 ' In Salyer, by
expressly finding the Reynolds rule to be inapplicable to this special
purpose district, the Court has implicitly acknowledged that within
this context, the right to vote is not fundamental. Once divested of
this status, albeit implicitly, Justice Rehnquist's application of the
rational relationship test logically follows. 72 Given this perspective,
the Court's use of reapportionment cases to defeat the appellants'
arguments directed at total exclusion from the franchise becomes
more understandable. Kramer, Cipriano, and Phoenix, the exclusion
cases relied upon so strongly by the appellants, represented an
extended application of the principles articulated in the reapportionment decisions. 73 Once these principles were found to be
inapplicable in Salyer, the Court was not constrained, as it had beenin Kramer, to use "close judicial scrutiny" to test the California
scheme.74 Voting in the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
is simply not a fundamental right. More precisely, had the Court
found the one man-one vote principle applicable in Salyer, it would
have been implicitly acknowledging the right to vote as fundamental in the context of district elections. A compelling interest test
would have naturally followed. Instead, the determination that the
69 See notes 33-4.5 and accompanying text supra.

70 Of the Salyer appellants, only the small landowners were raising an argument based
on apportionment principles.
71 See note 9 supra.
72 Under the standard two-tier approach rights which are not fundamental in nature
receive protection under the lower standard of review.
7' See text accompanying notes 9-20 supra.
74 Similarly, because voting is not a fundamental right in this context, the principle that
legislators are elected by people and not trees does not apply to special purpose districts of
this type.
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one man-one vote principle was inapplicable represented a value
judgment by the Court that the right to vote is nonfundamental
insofar as elections for district board of directors are concerned.
III
THE

Salyer

EXCEPTION:

ITS IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS

Despite earlier pronouncements to the contrary, 75 the effect of
Salyer has been to cast an uncertain shadow over the constitutional
protection to which voting is entitled.7 6 In the Tulare Water
District the failure of the Court to provide voting rights with the
protection of a strict scrutiny standard will have the effect of
eliminating truly contested district elections because one corporate
laridowner, by virtue of its holdings, is always assured a majority
Moreover, while the spectre of a
on the board of directors.
universal property qualification would certainly be an unrealistic
fear, the Court's decision will inevitably expand the power of other
corporations or individuals, similarly situated, to assert a dominant
influence in their particular locales. As such, nonproperty owners
and small landowners will be "relegated to a position of political
powerlessness" in special purpose districts which function on a
78
similar basis.
Salyer also represents a concern by the Court that the
reapportionment revolution may have too severely restricted efforts by local governmental units to experiment and innovate.
Significantly, the Salyer Court's approach to special purpose units
7' As recently as Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (citations omitted), the
Court stated:
[I]t is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute that
"places a condition on the exercise of the right to vote." This development in the
law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District. There we canvassed in detail
the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing the franchise,... noting inter
alia that such statutes "constitute the foundation of our representative society." We
concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and
denies the franchise to others, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions
are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."
76 In Kramer, the Court firmly took the position that the "need for exacting judicial
scrutiny of statutes distributing the franchise" is unaffected by the purpose of the particular
eiction. 395 U.S. at 628-29. This was the language relied upon for the Courts statement in
Dunn. See note 75 supra. The Salyer decision has severely limited the authoritative value of
the relevant language in both cases.
.77 As Justice Douglas pointed out: "The hold of J. G. Boswell Co. is so strong that there
has been no election since 1947, making little point of the [statutory] provision ... for an
election every other year." 410 U.S. at 735.
78 It appears, therefore, that the Court has sanctioned the establishment of a suspect
classification. See notes 14 & 57 supra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:687

and its resulting conclusion closely reflect positions voiced by Justices Harlan and Stewart in earlier dissenting opinions. 79 Dissenting
in Avery, Justice Harlan argued that the Court's decision, while
intending to provide equal protection to all voters, actually discriminated against the county's rural inhabitants because the ruling
ignored the fact that they had a substantially greater interest in the
affairs of the county governing board.8 ° Moreover, he warned that
rigid application of the one man-one vote principle to local governmental units would effectively "freeze" a functionally necessary
trend towards metropolitan consolidation. 8 1 Later, in Hadley, Jus79 It should be noted that Justice Harlan's basic philosophy was that the equal protection clause was not intended to restrict the right of the states to determine apportionment
plans for their electoral districts. 377 U.S. at 589-93.
11 390 U.S. at 491. Justice Harlan underscored this argument by pointing out that
[t]he commissioners court . . . performs more functions in the area . . . outside

Midland City than it does within the city limits. Therefore, each rural resident has a
greater interest in its activities than each city dweller. Yet under the majority's
for mula the urban residents are to have a dominant voice in the county government, precisely proportional to their numbers, and little or no allowance may be
made for the greater stake of the rural inhabitants in the county government.
Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added). On this point Justice Fortas was in substantial agreement. See
id. at 499 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 492-94. In support of this contention Justice Harlan made the following
argument:
Despite the majority's declaration that it is not imposing a "straightjacket" on
local governmental units . . . , its solution is likely to have other undesirable
"freezing" effects on local government. One readily foreseeable example is in the
crucial field of metropolitan government. A common pattern of development in the
Nation's urban areas has been for the less affluent citizens to migrate to or remain
within the central city, while the more wealthy move to the suburbs and come into
the city only to work. The result has been to impose a relatively heavier tax burden
upon city taxpayers and to fragmentize governmental services in the metropolitan
area. An oft-proposed solution to these problems has been the institution of an
integrated government encompassing the entire metropolitan area. In many instances, the suburbs may be included in such a metropolitan unit only by majority
vote of the voters in each suburb. As a practical matter, the suburbanites often will
be reluctant to join the metropolitan government unless they receive a share in the
government proportional to the benefits they bring with them and not merely to
their numbers. The city dwellers may be ready to concede this much, in return for
the ability to tax the suburbs. Under the majority's pronouncements, however, this
rational compromise would be forbidden: the metropolitan government must be
apportioned solely on the basis of population if it is a "general" government.
Id. (footnotes & citations omitted); see Dixon, Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some
Heresies-Concerning Citizen Participation,Community Action, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58
GEo. LJ. 955 (1970); Sentell, FederalizingThrough the Franchise: The Supreme Court and Local
Government, 6 GA. L. REV. 34 (1971); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment
Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1965);
Note, Special Service Districts in a City-County Consolidation: ConflictBetween MetropolitanReform
and "One Man-One Vote" in Indianapolis-MarionCounty, 47 IND. L.J. 101 (1971); Note, The
Impact of Voter Equality on the RepresentationalStructures of Local Government, 39 U. CHI. L. REv.
639 (1972). See generally M. PocK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE
METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS (1962); Symposium: RestructuringMetropolitanArea Government,
58 GEo. L.J. 663 (1970); Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1226 (1966).
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tice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, maintained that "[t]he need
for more flexibility becomes greater as we proceed down the
spectrum from the state legislature to the single-purpose local
entity,"8 2 and on this basis concluded that "specialized local governmental entities" necessarily fell outside the scope of the Reynolds
principle because of their varied impact on different
constituencies.8 3 What underlies these opinions is a philosophy
articulated by Justice Stewart that when voters are protected by the
one man-one vote principle in general elections on the state and
federal levels, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to rigidly
apply the Reynolds rule to situations where different groups have
substantially different interests in the matters of a particular unit of
84
local government.
Certainly the Court's willingness to exempt special purpose
units from the reach of one man-one vote, and accordingly to
82

397 U.S. at 67. This philosophy seemed to underlie the Court's decision in Abate v.

Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).
83 397 U.S. at 61. Justice Harlan was not speaking directly about the type of situation
involved in Salyer. His dissent in Avery primarily dealt with county units exercising general
government powers which affected different groups differently and not with specialized
units per se. In Hadley, Justice Harlan made the following distinction with specific reference
to special purpose units:
If local units having general governmental powers are to be considered, like state
legislatures, as having a substantial identity of function that justifies imposing on
them a uniformity of elective structure, it is dear that specialized local entities are
characterized by precisely the opposite of such identity. From irrigation districts to
air pollution control agencies to school districts, such units vary in the magnitude of
their impact upon various constituencies and in the manner in which the benefits
and burdens of their operations interact with other elements of the local political
and economic picture. Today's ruling will forbid these agencies from adopting
electoral mechanisms that take these variations into account.
Id. Note however that the Hadley Court, citing Sailor v. Kent Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105
(1970), and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1970), maintained that the Constitution does
permit flexibility and experimentation on the local level and that the states' efforts in this
area have not been inhibited. 397 U.S. at 58; see note 6 supra.
84 Dissenting in Kramer, Justice Stewart argued:
[W]e are dealing here, not with a general election, but with a limited, specialpurpose election. The appellant is eligible to vote in all state, local, and federal
elections in which general governmental policy is determined ....He clearly is not
locked into any self-perpetuating status of exclusion from the electoral process.
395 U.S. at 640 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Justice Stewart seemed to be suggesting that the right to vote in special purpose district elections is not fundamental because the
individual's interests are adequately guarded by his right to vote in all general, local, state,
and federal elections.
As to special purpose units, Justice Stewart remarked:
Special-purpose governmental authorities such as water, lighting, and sewer
districts exist in various sections of the country, and participation in such districts is
undoubtedly limited in many instances to those who partake of the agency's services
and are assessed for its expenses. The constitutional validity of such a policy is, it
seems to me, unquestionable.
Id. at n.9.
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apply a less stringent ltest in evaluating infringements on the right
in district elections, will permit more flexibility than the pre-Salyer
strict scrutiny approach. As such, the decision's impact will no
doubt be substantial because as of 1967 "there were at least 21,264
special districts in the United States-a total that exceeds the
number of all cities and counties combined. '85 This surely will
result in a considerable increase in litigation, for the Salyer Court
did not enunciate general standards to determine whether a particular district falls within its rationale. The lack of adequate
standards is of added independent significance because future
decisions may therefore turn on subjective considerations. As a
result, in many cases the party seeking relief will be made extremely vulnerable to possible disenfranchisement when his "lack
of a 'substantial interest' might [really] mean no more than a
different interest" politically or otherwise.86
To what extent this newly carved exception to Reynolds will
emasculate the one man-one vote principle will ultimately depend
upon the degree of recognition the Court is willing to give to the
Harlan-Stewart concept of "substantial interest. ' 87 Yet, even in the
absence of guidelines, state legislatures should be aware that
merely labeling a local governmental unit as a special purpose
district will not automatically trigger a favorable reaction by the
Supreme Court. For example, the junior college district in Hadley
arguably may have been considered a special purpose unit, but the
Court held that it was subject to the mandate of one man-one
vote. 88 If a guiding standard may be discerned from Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, it is that a special purpose district must have a
"special limited purpose" which is "far removed from normal
governmental activities" and which "disproportionately affect[s]
different groups." 89 Given this standard, the junior college district
85 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, supra

note 24, at 37.

This figure does not include school districts. Note that while the number of these units in
1967 was 21,264, at that time their rate of growth was 16%. Id. at 41.
88 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970). The Court, citing Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965), warned that " '[fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the
population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible." Id.
87 See generally notes 79-84 supra.
88 The junior college trustees had authority to
levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers,
make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to
annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage
the operations of the junior college.
397 U.S. at 53 (footnote omitted). Compare notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra. See also
note 35 supra.
89 410 U.S. at 727-28.
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in Hadley did not qualify because "[e]ducation has traditionally
been a vital governmental function," 90 and it would therefore seem
that local school boards would be similarly disqualified. Nor, as the
Court suggests, would a special purpose unit which, in addition to
its designated purpose, provides "other general public services such
as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else
of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body," be able to fit
within the exception. 9 ' Finally, a salient feature of Salyer was Justice
Rehnquist's concentration on the economic operations of the district, and on what he perceived to have been the disproportionate
economic burdens shouldered by landowners. 9 2 As a result of the
Court's emphasis on economic considerations, it is posited that
Salyer contemplates the existence of both a "special limited purpose" and the imposition of disproportionate economic consequences upon a readily definable class as necessary prerequisites to the application of the one man-one vote exception. Until
the Court further clarifies its position, future legislative decisions
93
should be made with these considerations in mind.
CONCLUSION

In Salyer, the Supreme Court sustained a proportional voting
scheme which effectively denies the franchise to those otherwise
qualified voters who hold no property, and which emasculates the
vote of small landowners. This has been accomplished by carving
an exception to what had been a well-established reapportionment
principle. The Court's decision was partially in response to the
needs of local government for greater flexibility and for extended
opportunities for innovation. 4 Whether Salyer will provide local
90 397 U.S. at 56.

91 410 U.S. at 728-29 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 729-34; see note 59 supra.
93 The guidelines formulated here have been deliberately designed to narrowly construe the potential scope of the Salyer exception. Although the Court's actual standards
might be more flexible, the legislator should be cognizant of the decision's possible limitations. See generally notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
94Justice Harlan's viewpoints on this matter (see note 81 supra) are by no means
universally accepted. There have been arguments that reapportionment has provided a
fresh impetus to local government, has encouraged city-county cooperation, and has generally created a wide range of new alternatives for reform. See Grant & McArthur, "One
Man-One Vote" and County Government: Rural, Urban, and Metropolitan Implications, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 760 (1968); Hergert, The Impact of the FourteenthAmendment on the Structure of
Metropolitan and Regional Governments, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 763 (1972); Jones, Metropolitan
Detente: Is It Politically and Constitutionally Possible?, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 741 (1968); McKay,
Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 713 (1968).
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units with more flexibility is problematical and of secondary importance. The more fundamental question to be resolved is whether
the benefits which actually accrue will have been worth jeopardizing the concept of voting as a fundamental right.
Michael Goldsmith

